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Jewish Views on Abortion
Rabbi D. Immanuel Jakobovits
With the rise in illegal abortions, there is increasing pressure for a
liberalization of the existing laws regulating abortion. in the middle of
the clamor stand the religious institutions divided in their views. Rabbi
Jakobovits discusses the Orthodox Jewish position in contrast to the more
liberal Conservative and Reform views, stating that the traditional stand
is somewhere between the more rigid Catholic view and the more per-
missive Protestant position. The author explains that Jewish law per-
mits an abortion only when the mother's life is placed in danger, seem-
ingly based on a theory of self-defense. Aside from this one situation,
however, the Jewish law states that the individual's claim to life is con-
trolling, even in cases of monster-births, illegitimate children, or rapes.
Dr. Jakobovits expresses some concern that the present system might be
changed thereby giving the life-and-death decisions on granting abortions
to people not trained in moral issues.
WITH THE staggering rise in the rate of abortions - the over-
whelming majority of them illegal according to most states'
laws - and with the motives for such operations now including
the fear of abnormal births as well as birth-control considerations,
abortion has lately become the
THE AUTHOR (B.A., Ph.D., University most widely debated medico-
of London, Rabbinical Diploma, Yeshiva moral subject. What was pre-
Etz Chaim, London) is Rabbi of the viously either a therapeutic
Fifth Avenue Synagogue in New York
City. Before assuming this post in 1958, measure for the safety of the
Rabbi Dr. Jakobovits was Chief Rabbi of mother, or a plainly criminal
Ireland. act is now being widely advo-
cated as a means to prevent the
birth of possibly defective children, to curb the sordid indignities
and hazards imposed on women resorting to clandestine operators,
and simply to contain the population explosion. Under the mount-
ing pressure of these new factors, combined with the widespread
violation of the existing laws even by reputable practitioners, there
is increasing agitation for a liberalization of these laws, particularly
among physicians.' Many physicians, individually and as organized
I The New York Academy of Medicine, in a report by its Committee on Public
Health, has pleaded that "permissive medical practices based on sound medical judg-
ment should be recognized, not forbidden by law . . ." and it recommended an amend-
ment to the State Penal Law "to legalize therapeutic abortion when there is substantial
risk that the continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental
health of the mother, or that the child would be born with grave physical or mental
defects." The report argued that the present law "places the physician who performs
the therapeutic abortion and the hospital where it is done in the position of breaking
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groups, are pressing for legislative modifications which would give
them far more discretionary power than they presently enjoy. They
claim that, within some broad general guidelines, the decision
whether or not legally to terminate a pregnancy should be left to
their judgment. In part, this claim is already being asserted on a
wide scale through the establishment at numerous hospitals of
"abortion boards," composed solely of physicians, charged with the
responsibility of sanctioning all such operations.
In the Jewish view, this line of argument cannot be upheld.
The judgment that is here required, while it may be based on medi-
cal evidence, is clearly of a moral nature. The decision on whether,
and under what circumstances, it is right to destroy a germinating
human life, depends on the assessment and weighing of values, on
determining the title to life in any given case. Such value judg-
ments are entirely outside the province of medical science. No
amount of training or experience in medicine can help in ascertain-
ing the criteria necessary for reaching such capital verdicts, for mak-
ing such life-and-death decisions. Such judgments pose essentially a
moral, not a medical, problem. Hence they call for the judgment of
moral, not medical, specialists.
Physicians, by demanding that as the practitioners in this field
they should have the right to determine or adjudicate the laws gov-
erning their practice, are making an altogether unprecedented claim
not advanced by any other profession. Lawyers do not argue that,
because law is their speciality, the decision on what is legal should
be left to their conscience. And teachers do not claim that, as the
profession competent in education, the laws governing their work,
such as on prayers at public schools, should be administered or de-
fined at their discretion. Such claims are patently absurd, for they
would demand jurisdiction on matters completely beyond their pro-
fessional competence.
There is no more justice or logic in advancing similar claims for
the medical profession. A physician, in performing an abortion or
any other procedure involving moral considerations, such as artifi-
cial insemination or euthanasia, is merely a technical expert; but
he is no more qualified than any other layman to pronounce on the
the law, even when they are adhering to what they believe to be sound medical practice."
N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1964, p. 48, col. 5. (Emphasis added.) A subsequent report
indicated that 87.6% of New York obstetricians answering a questionnaire favored
the change in the law, and that the President of the Association for Humane Abortion,
who called the existing law "inhumane and unrealistic," had admitted that "reputable
physicians often perform therapeutic abortions, in respectable New York hospitals,
which are not strictly legal." N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1965, p. 73, col. 5.
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rights or legality of such acts, let alone to determine what these
rights should be, relying merely on the whims or dictates of his
conscience. The decision on whether a human life, once conceived,
is to be or not to be, therefore, properly belongs to moral experts,
or to legislatures guided by such experts.
I. JEWISH LAW
A. The Claims of Judaism
Every monotheistic religion embodies within its philosophy and
legislation a system of ethics - a definition of moral values. None
does so with greater precision and comprehensiveness than Judaism.
It emphatically insists that the norms of moral conduct can be gov-
erned neither by the accepted notions of public opinion nor by the
individual conscience. In the Jewish view, the human conscience
is meant to enforce laws, not to make them. Right and wrong,
good and evil, are absolute values which transcend the capricious
variations of time, place, and environment, just as they defy defini-
tion by relation to human intuition or expediency. These values,
Judaism teaches, derive their validity from the Divine revelation
at Mount Sinai, as expounded and developed by sages faithful to,
and authorized by, its writ.
B. The Sources of Jewish Law
For a definition of these values, one must look to the vast and
complex corpus of Jewish law, the authentic expression of all Jew-
ish religious and moral thought. The literary depositories of
Jewish law extend over nearly four thousand years, from the Bible
and the Talmud, serving as the immutable basis of the main prin-
ciples, to the great medieval codes and the voluminous rabbinical
responsa writings recording practical verdicts founded on these prin-
ciples, right up to the present day.
These sources, to be detailed below, spell out a very distinct at-
titude on all aspects of the abortion problem. They clearly indicate
that Judaism, while it does not share the rigid stand of the Roman
Catholic Church which unconditionally proscribes any direct destruc-
tion of the fetus from the moment of conception, refuses to en-
dorse the far more permissive views of many Protestant denomina-
tions. The traditional Jewish position is somewhere between these
two extremes, corresponding roughly to the law as currently in force
[VoL 17: 480
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in all but five American states, namely, recognizing only a grave
hazard to the mother as a legitimate indication for therapeutic abor-
tion.'
(1) Abortion in the Bible.-The legislation of the Bible makes
only one reference to our subject, and this is by implication:
And if men strive together, and hurt a woman with child, so that
her fruit depart, and yet no harm follow, he shall be surely fined,
according as the woman's husband shall lay upon him; and he
shall pay as the judges determine. But if any harm follow, then
shalt thou give life for life...
(a) The Jewish Interpretation.-This crucial passage, by one
of the most curious twists of literary fortunes, marks the parting
of the ways between the Jewish and Christian rulings on abortion.
According to the Jewish interpretation, if "no harm follow" the
"hurt" to the woman resulting in the loss of her fruit refers to the
survival of the woman following her miscarriage; in that case there
is no capital guilt involved, and the attacker is merely liable to pay
compensation for the loss of her fruit. "But if any harm follow,"
i.e., if the woman is fatally injured, then the man responsible for
her death has to "give life for life"; in that event the capital charge
of murder exempts him from any monetary liability for the aborted
fruit.'
This interpretation is also borne out by the rabbinical exegesis
of the verse defining the law of murder: "He that smiteth a man,
so that he dieth, shall surely be put to death.. ."' which the Rabbis
construed to mean "a man, but not a fetus."'
These passages dearly indicate that the killing of an unborn
child is not considered as murder punishable by death in Jewish law.
(b) The Christian Interpretation.-The Christian tradition
disputing this view goes back to a mistranslation in the Septuagint.
2 The only states in which health risks, too, are recognized as a legal ground for
abortion are Alabama, Colorado, Maryland, New Mexico, and Oregon. See ALA. CODE
tit. 14 § 9 (1958); COLO. Ruv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-23 (1963); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 3 (1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-3 (1953); ORE. R.v. STAT. § 163.060
(1957).
3 Exodus 21:22-23.
4 Mekhilta and Rashi. For a translation of these sources, see 3 LAUTERBAC-, ME-
KHiLTA 66-67 (1935); ROSENBAuM & SILBERMAN, PENTATEucH AND RASH'S COM-
mENTARY 112-13 (1930).
5 Exodus 21:12. (Emphasis added.)
O Afekhilta and Rashi. For a translation of these sources, see 3 LAUTERBACH, op.
cit. supra note 4, at 32-33; ROSENBAUM & SILBERMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 110-10a.
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There, the Hebrew for "no harm follow" was replaced by the
Greek for "[her child be born] imperfectly formed."7  This in-
terpretation, distinguishing between an unformed and a formed
fetus and branding the killing of the latter as murder, was ac-
cepted by Tertullian, who was ignorant of Hebrew, and by later
church fathers. The distinction was subsequently embodied in
canon law as well as in Justinian Law.8 This position was further
reinforced by the belief that the "animation" (entry of the soul)
of a fetus occurred on the fortieth or eightieth day after concep-
tion for males and females respectively, an idea first expressed
by Aristotle,9 and by the doctrine, firmly enunciated by Saint
Augustine and other early Christian authorities, that the un-
born child was included among those condemned to eternal perdi-
tion if he died unbaptized.'0 Some even regarded the death or
murder of an unborn child as a greater calamity than that of a bap-
tized person." Eventually the distinction between animate and in-
animate fetuses was lost; and since 1588, the Catholic Church has
considered as murder the killing of any human fruit from the mo-
ment of conception.'"
This position is maintained to the present day.'" It assumes that
potential life, even in the earliest stages of gestation, enjoys the same
value as any existing adult life. Hence, the Catholic Church never
tolerates any direct abortion, even when, by alowing the pregnancy
to continue, both mother and child will perish;' 4 for "better two
deaths than one murder."' 5
(2) Abortion in the Talmud.-Jewish law assumes that the
full title to life arises only at birth. Accordingly, the Talmud rules:
If a woman is in hard travail [and her life cannot otherwise be
7 The mistranslation, also followed in the Samaritan and Karaite versions, is evi-
dently based on reading "zurah" or "surah" (meaning "form") for "ason" (meaning
"harm" or "accident"). See KAUFMANN, GEDIuNKscsmnr 186 (1900).
8 See WESTERMARCK, CRISTIAN=ry AND MORALS 243 (1939).
9 AISTOTLE, DE ANim. HIsT., vii. 3; see 1 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 46-48
(1907).
10 See 1 PLoss & BARTELS, WOMAN 483 (1935); 2 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA
266-67 (1907).
11 See 2 LECKY, HISTORY OF EUROPEAN M ORALS 23-24 (3d ed. 1891).
12 See 1 PLOSS & BARTELS, op. cit. supra note 10, at 484; BONNAR, THE CATHOLIC
DOCTOR 78 (1948).
'
3 See e.g., CATHOLIC HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND CAN-
ADA, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HOSPITALS 4 (1949).
14 See BONNAR, op. cit. supra note 12, at 84.
15 Tiberghien, Principles et Conscience Morale, CAHIEs LAsNNAC, Oct. 1946, p.
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saved], one cuts up the child within her womb and extracts it
member by member, because her life comes before that of [the
child]. But if the greater part [or the head] was delivered,
one may not touch it, for one may not set aside one person's life
for the sake of another.16
This ruling, sanctioning embryotomy to save the mother in her
mortal conflict with her unborn child, is also the sole reference to
abortion in the principal codes of Jewish law.' They add only the
further argument that such a child, being in "pursuit" of the mother's
life, may be destroyed as an "aggressor" following the general prin-
ciple of self-defense. 8
This formulation of the attitude toward abortion ila the classic
sources of Jewish law implies (1) that the only indication con-
sidered for abortion is a hazard to the mother's life, and (2) that,
otherwise, the destruction of an unborn child is a grave offense, al-
though not murder.
(3) Abortion in Rabbinical Writings.-Some of these conclu-
sions, and their ramifications, are more fully discussed in later rab-
binical writings, notably the prolific responsa literature. Before de-
tailing a few of these writings, it should be pointed out that criminal
abortion, as distinct from therapeutic abortion, is scarcely mentioned
in Jewish sources at all. This omission seems all the more glaring in
view of the extraordinary attention given to the subject in Christian
literature and other legislation in ancient, medieval, and modern
times. Criminal abortion was, with few exceptions, simply nonexistent
in Jewish society. Consequently, the legal and moral problems
involved were rarely submitted to rabbinical judgment, and their
consideration thus did not enter into the responsa, at least not until
comparatively recent times. 9
Elaborating on the law as defined in the Talmud and the codes,
the responsa add several significant rulings. While the status of a
child conceived by rape is not discussed, several opinions are ex-
pressed on the legality of aborting a product of incest or adultery,
both capital offenses in Biblical law. One eighteenth century
authority considered the case of an adulteress different insofar as
18 TALMUD, ToHRoTo II Oholoth 7:6.
1 7 MAIMONIDBS, IHIL. RoTz'AcH, 1:9; SHULCHAN ARUKH, Choshen Mishpat
425:2.
'
8 This is based on a discussion of the Mishnah, TALMUD, Sanhedrin 72b. See
generaly JAKOBOVITS, JEwiSH mIcAL ETrIcs 184-91 (1962).
19 See JAKOBOVITS, op. cit. supra note 18, at 181.
1965]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
her capital guilt would also forfeit the life of the fruit she carried."0
But others maintained that there could be no distinction between a
bastard and a legitimate fetus in this respect, and that any sanction
to destroy such a product would open the floodgates to immorality
and debauchery.2 A later responsum also prohibited such an opera-
tion.
22
Since the Talmud permits the sacrifice of the child to save the
mother only prior to the emergence of its head or the greater part
of its body from the birth canal,23 a widely discussed question con-
cerns the right to dismember the fetus even during the final stage
of parturition if it is feared that otherwise both mother and child
may die. As the danger to the mother usually is likely to occur be-
fore that stage is reached, this is mainly a hypothetical question, but
it may be of some practical significance in the case of a breech-birth
if the child's head cannot be extracted following the delivery of
the rest of the body. Notwithstanding the rule that the child in
principle assumes full and equal human rights once the major part
is born, and that consequently one may not thereafter save one life
(the mother's) at the cost of another (the child's), this particular
case may be an exception because (1) the child is liable to die in
any event, whether the operation is carried out or not, while the
mother can be rescued at the expense of the child, and (2) in the
Jewish view the viability of a child is not fully established until it
has passed the thirtieth day of its life, so that of the two lives here
at stake the one is certain and established, while the other is still in
some doubt. This slight inequality in value is too insignificant to
warrant the deliberate sacrifice of the child for the sake of the
mother if, without such sacrifice, the child would survive; but it is
a sufficient factor to tip the scales in favor of the mother if the alter-
native is the eventual loss of both lives. Hence, with one excep-
tion,2' rabbinical verdicts are inclined to countenance the interven-
tion, provided the physician is confident of the success of the opera-
tion.'
5
2 0 EMDEN, RESPONSA SHE'ILATH YA'AVETZ, pt. 1, no. 43. Cf. note 53 infra.
2 1 BAC-IARACH, RESPONSA CHAVATH YA'IR no. 31.
22 HALEVI, RESPONSA LECHEM HAPANIM, KUNTERIs ACHARON no. 19.
23 See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
24 SOPHER, RESPONSA MACHANEH CHAYIM Choshen Mishpat, pt. 2, no. 50.
Some authorities left the question unresolved, see EGER, OHOLOTH 7:6; MEIR OF Ei-
SENSTADT, RESPONSA PANIM MVE'IROTH, pt. 2, no. 8.
25 SCHICK, RESPONSA MAHARAM SHIK, Yoreh De'ah no. 155; HoFFMANN, RE-
SPONSA MELAMED LEHO'IL, Yoreh Deah no. 69.
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(4) Deformed Children in Rabbinical Writings.-More re-
cently the tragic problem of abortions indicated by suspected
fetal defects has occupied considerable space in rabbinical writ-
ings. The recognition of this problem only dates from 1941,
when an Australian medical journal first drew attention to the in-
cidence of abnormalities resulting from rubella26 in the mother dur-
ing her early pregnancy. Since then, the legal, moral, and religious
issues involved have been widely but still inconclusively debated in
medical as well as non-medical circles. They aroused much public
controversy when it was established that the birth of thousands of
deformed babies could be traced to drugs, notably thalidomide,
taken by pregnant mothers and when many such mothers sought to
have their pregnancies terminated for fear that they would deliver
malformed children.
All the authorities of Jewish law are agreed that physical or
mental abnormalities do not in themselves compromise the title to
life, whether before or after birth. Cripples and idiots, however in-
capacitated, enjoy the same human rights (though not necessarily
legal competence) as normal persons." Human life being infinite
in value, its sanctity is bound to be entirely unaffected by the
absence of any or all mental faculties or by any bodily defects: any
fraction of infinity still remains infinite.
(5) Monster-Births in Rabbinical Writings.-The absolute
inviolability of any human being, however deformed, was affirmed
in the first responsum on the status of monster-births. Early in the
nineteenth century, a famous rabbinical scholar advised a questioner
that it was forbidden to destroy a grotesquely misshapen child; he
ruled that to kill, or even starve to death, any being born of a human
mother was unlawful as homicide." Indeed, in a somewhat less
legal context, a twelfth century moralistic work referred to a ruling
against terminating the life of a child born with teeth and a tail like
an animal, counseling instead the removal of these features.29
2 6 German measles. See Gregg, Congenital Cataract Following German Measles in
Mother, 3 TRANSACrIONS OF TmE OPHTHALMOLOGICAL SOC'Y OP AUSTRALIA 35-46
(1941); see also Swan, Tostevin, Mayo & Black, Congenital Defects in Infants Follow-
ing Infectious Diseases Daring Pregnancy, 2 MEDICAL J. OF AUSTRALIA 201-10
(1943).
07-See M-ISHNAH BERURAH, BI'UR HALAKHAH, ON ORACH CHAYIM 329:4. An
idiot can even sue for injuries inflicted on him. TALMUD, Baba Kamma 8:4. Again,
the killing of even a dying person is culpable as murder. MAIMONNmES, HI.. ROTzE-
AcM 2:7.
2 8 ELEZAR FLECKELES, RESPONSA TESHUVAH MI_'AHAVAH, pr. 1, no. 53. See
ZMMELs, MAGICIANS, THEOLOGIANS AND DocroRS 72 (1952).
2 9 SEPH1R CHAsIDIM no. 186 (Zitomir ed. 1879).
19651
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
C. Arguments Against the Destruction of Defectives
Based on these principles and precedents, present-day rabbis are
unanimous in condemning abortion, feticide, or infanticide to elimi-
nate a crippled being, before or after birth, as an unconscionable
attack on the sanctity of life. Further considerations leading to this
conclusion include the arguments that, conversely, the saving of an
unborn child's life justifies the violation of the Sabbath (permitted
only when human life is at stake);"o that such a child is not in
"pursuit" of the mother, thus excluding an important condition for
the right to perform a therapeutic abortion;3 that the interruption
of a pregnancy is not without hazards to the mother, particularly
the danger of rendering her sterile and the increase in maternal mor-
tality resulting from abortions, as attested by physicians;32 and that
the killing of an embryo, while technically not murder due to a
'*scriptural decree," yet constitutes "an appurtenance of murder" be-
cause "in matters affecting human life we also consider that which
is going to be [a human being] without any further action, follow-
ing the laws of nature."33
These considerations would be valid even if it were known for
certain that the expected child would be born deformed. The al-
most invariable doubts about such a contingency only strengthen
the objections to abortion in these circumstances, especially in view
of the Talmudic maxim that in matters of life and death the usual
majority rule does not operate; any chance, however slim, that a
life may be saved must always be given the benefit of the doubt. 4
A similar attitude was adopted in a recent rabbinical article 5 on
the celebrated trial in Liege (Belgium) in which a mother and others
were acquitted of guilt for the confessed killing of a thalidomide
baby. The author denounces abortion for such a purpose as well
as the Liege verdict. "The sole legitimate grounds for killing a
fetus are the urgent needs of the mother and her healing, whereas
in these circumstances the mother's efforts to have the child aborted
30 See BACHARAC-, op. cit. supra note 21. But there is some rabbinical dispute on
this opinion. See JAKOBOVITS, op. cit. supra note 18, at 279 n.38.
3 1 See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
32 UNTERMAN, 6 NO'AM (Jerusalem) 1 (1963). Unterman, Chief Rabbi of Israel,
refers to medical evidence given him by Professor Asherman, Director of the Maternity
Department of the Municipal Hadassah Hospital in Tel Aviv. See also note 43 infra.
33 Ibid.
3 4 TALMUD, YoMA 84; SHULcHAN ARUKH, Orach Chayim, 329:2. See also note
45 infra.
3 5 ZWEIG, 7 NO'AM (Jerusalem) 36 (1964).
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are based on self-love and plain egotism, wrapped in a cloak of
compassion for this unfortunate creature, and this cannot be called
a necessity for the mother at all." 6
D. Psychological Considerations
On the other hand, Jewish law would consider a grave psycho-
logical hazard to the mother as no less weighty a reason for an abor-
tion than a physical threat. On these grounds a seventeenth century
responsum permitted an abortion in a case where it was feared the
mother would otherwise suffer an attack of hysteria imperiling her
life. 7 If it is genuinely feared that a continued pregnancy and
eventual birth under these conditions might have such debilitating
effects on the mother as to present a danger to her own life or the
life of another by suicidal or violent tendencies, however remote this
danger may be, a therapeutic abortion may be indicated with the
same justification as for other medical reasons. But this fear would
have to be very real, attested to by the most competent psychiatric
opinion, and based on previous experiences of mental imbalance. 8
H. MORAL AND SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The legalistic structure of these conclusions must be viewed in
the context of Judaism's moral philosophy and against the back-
ground of contemporary social conditions.
A. The "Cruelty" of the Abortion Laws
At the outset, it is essential, in order to arrive at an objective
judgment, to disabuse one's mind of the often one-sided, if not
grossly partisan, arguments in the popular (and sometimes medical)
presentations of the issues involved. A hue and cry is raised about
the "cruelty" of the present abortion laws. 9 Harrowing scenes are
depicted, in the most lurid colors, of girls and married women sell-
ing their honor and their fortunes, exposing themselves to mayhem
and death at the hands of some greedy and ill-qualified abortionist
in a dark, unhygienic back-alley, and facing the prospect of being
36 Ibid.
37 MIZRACHT, RESPONSA P'RI HA'ARETz, Yoreh De'ah no. 21.
3 8 UNTERMAN, HATORAH VEHAMEDINAH 25, 29 (4th ser. 1952); FRIEDMAN,
RESPONSA NEZR MATA'AI pt. 1, no. 8; FEINSTmN, RESPONSA IGROTH MOSHEH
Orach Chayim pt. 4, no. 88. These authorities permit the violation of the Sabbath for
the sake of psychiatric patients.
39 See editorial in N.Y. Times, April 7, 1965, p. 42, col. 2, commenting on CBS TV
program of April 5, 1965; See also editorial in N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1965, p. 20, col. 2.
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hunted and haunted like criminals for the rest of their lives - all
because safe, honorable, and reasonably priced methods to achieve
the same ends are barred from hospitals and licensed physicians'
offices by our "barbaric" statutes. Equally distressing are the ac-
counts and pictures of pitifully deformed children born because our
"antiquated" abortion laws did not permit us to forestall their and
their parents' misfortune. And then there are, of course, always
heart-strings or sympathy to be pulled by the sight of "unwanted"
children taxing the patience and resources of parents already
"burdened" with too large a brood.
There is, inevitably, some element of cruelty in most laws. For
a person who has spent his last cent before the tax-bill arrives, the
income tax laws are unquestionably "cruel"; and to a man passionate-
ly in love with a married woman the adultery laws must appear "bar-
baric." Even more universally "harsh" are the military draft regula-
tions which expose young men to acute danger and their families to
great anguish and hardship.
B. Moral Standards in Society
All these resultant "cruelties" are surely no valid reason for
changing those laws. No civilized society could survive without laws
which occasionally spell some suffering for individuals. Nor can
any public moral standards be maintained without strictly enforced
regulations calling for extreme restraints and sacrifices in some
cases. If the criterion for the legitimacy of laws were to be the
complete absence of "cruel" effects, we should abolish or drastically
liberalize not only our abortion laws, but our statutes on marriage,
narcotics, homosexuality, suicide, euthanasia, and numerous other
laws which inevitably result in personal anguish from time to time.
So far our reasoning, which could be supported by any number
of references to Jewish tradition, has merely sought to demolish the
"cruelty" factor as a valid argument per se by which to judge the
justice or injustice of any law. It still has to be demonstrated that
the restrictions on abortion are morally sound enough and suffi-
ciently important to the public welfare to outweigh the consequen-
tial hardships in individual cases.
C. The Hidden Side of the Problem
What the fuming editorials and harrowing documentaries on
the abortion problem do not show are pictures of radiant mothers
[Vol. 17: 480
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fondling perfectly healthy children who would never have been
alive if their parents had been permitted to resort to abortion in
moments of despair. There are no statistics on the contributions to
society of outstanding men and women who would never have been
born had the abortion laws been more liberal. Nor is it known how
many "unwanted" children eventually turn out to be the sunshine
of their families.
A Jewish moralistic work of the twelfth century relates the
following deeply significant story:
A person constantly said that, having already a son and a daugh-
ter, he was anxious lest his wife become pregnant again. For he
was not rich and asked how would he find sufficient sustenance.
Said a sage to him: "When a child is born, the Holy One, blessed
be He, provides the milk beforehand in the mother's breast; there-
fore, do not worry." But he did not accept the wise man's words,
and he continued to fret. Then a son was born to him. After
a while, the child became ill, and the father turned to the sage:
"Pray for my son that he shall live." Exclaimed the sage: "To you
applies the biblical verse: 'Suffer not thy mouth to bring thy flesh
into guilt.' "40
Some children may be born unwanted, but there are no unwanted
children aged five or ten years.
D. Abortion Statistics
There are, then - even from the purely utilitarian viewpoint
of "cruelty" versus "happiness" or "usefulness" - two sides to this
problem, and not just one as pretended by those agitating for re-
form. There are the admittedly tragic cases of maternal indignities
and deaths as well as of congenital deformities resulting from our
restrictive abortion laws. But, on the other hand, there are the count-
less happy children and useful citizens whose births equally result
from these laws. What is the ratio between these two categories?
If one considers that even with the existing, rigid laws there are
well over one million abortions performed annually in the United
States (most of them by reputable physicians), it stands to reason
that a relaxation of these laws would raise the abortion rate by
many millions. In Hungary, for instance, where abortions were
legalized in 1956, state physicians have terminated about two mil-
lion pregnancies since then (in a population of ten million),
amounting to three abortions for every live birth.4 Even allowing
40 SEPHER CHASEnv, op. cit. supra note 29, no. 520.
41 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1965, p. 14, col. 3.
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for the more widespread recourse to birth control and for some
stricter controls in the proposed abortion laws in this country, there
can be little doubt that the American abortion rate would soar to at
least two or three times the present number (probably a gross un-
derestimate) if the proposed changes were adopted.
Out of the three million pregnancies that would probably be
terminated every year, no more than 30,00042 would have resulted
in deformed births, while the remaining 99 per cent would have
been healthy children, had their mothers been allowed or forced to
carry them to term. Subtract from this latter figure the number of
mothers whose hazards would be minimized if they did not feel
compelled to resort to clandestine operations, and one would still
have only a relatively minute proportion of abortions that would be
fully justified for the reasons advanced by the advocates of liberali-
zation. Well over 95 per cent, if not 98 per cent, of all abortions
would eliminate normal children of healthy mothers. In fact, as
for the mothers, the increased recourse to abortion (even if per-
formed by qualified physicians), far from reducing hazards, would
increase them, since such operations leave at least five per cent of
the women sterile,43 not to mention the rise in the resultant mortal-
ity rate. One can certainly ask if the extremely limited reduction in
the number of malformed children and maternal mortality risks
really justify the annual wholesale destruction of three million
germinating, healthy lives, most of them potentially happy and use-
ful citizens, especially in a country as under-populated as America
(compared to Europe, for instance, which commands far fewer
natural resources).
E. The Individual's Claim to Life
These numerical facts alone make nonsense of the argument for
more and easier abortions. But moral norms cannot be determined
by numbers. In the Jewish view, "he who saves one life is as if he
42 This is the number of defective births resulting from German measles anticipated
for 1965 in the United States. To this number may have to be added anticipated ab-
normalities for other reasons, but from it would have to be subtracted the considerably
larger number of cases in which affected mothers would not resort to abortion, either
because of their opposition to abortion or because the condition is undetected during
pregnancy. The total of abortions fully justified by actual (not suspected) fetal de-
fects due to factors that could be recognized during pregnancy could thus scarcely ex-
ceed 30,000.
43 See N.Y. Times report, note 41 supra.
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saved an entire world";44 one human life is as precious as a million
lives, for each is infinite in value. Hence, even if the ratio were
reversed, and there was only a one per cent chance that the child
to be aborted would be normal - in fact the chances invariably
exceed 50 per cent in any given case4 5- - the consideration for that
one child in favor of life would outweigh any counter-indication for
the other 99 per cent.
But, in truth, such a counter-indication, too, is founded on fal-
lacious premises. Assuming one were 100 per cent certain (perhaps
by radiological evidence) that a child would be born deformed,
could this affect its claim to life? Any line to be drawn between
normal and abnormal beings determining their right to live would
have to be altogether arbitrary. Would grave defect in one limb
or in two limbs, or an anticipated sub-normal intelligence quotient of
seventy-five or fifty make the capital difference between one who is
entitled to live and one who is not? And if the absence of two limbs
deprives a person of his claim to life, what about one who loses two
limbs in an accident? By what moral reasoning can such a defect be
a lesser cause for denying the right to live than a similar congenital
abnormality? Surely life-and-death verdicts cannot be based on
such tenuous distinctions.
F. The Obligations of Society
The birth of a physically or mentally maldeveloped child
may be an immense tragedy in a family, just as a crippling ac-
cident or a lingering illness striking a family member later in life
may be. But one cannot purchase the relief from such misfortunes
at the cost of life itself. So long as the sanctity of life is recognized
as inviolable, the cure to suffering cannot be abortion before
birth, any more than murder (whether in the form of euthanasia
or of suicide) after birth. The only legitimate relief in such cases
is for society to assume the burdens which the individual family can
no longer bear. Since society is the main beneficiary of restrictive
4 4 TALMUD, Sanhedrin 4:5. For this reason, Jewish law forbids the surrender of a
single life even if any number of other lives may thereby be saved. MAIMONIDEs, HIL.
YESODBi HAToRAH 5:5.
4 5 Estimates of the rate of abnormalities resulting from German measles have varied
widely, but none of them approaches 50%. The rate among live-born babies was re-
cently found to be under 10%, and "one can conclude [from various studies] that the
incidences of congenital malformations reported by early workers are fantastically high
and incorrect. The recommendation of therapeutic abortion based on those rates is not
medically justified." Greenberg, Pellitteri & Barton, Frequency of Defects in Infants
Whose Mothers Had Rubella During Pregnancy, 165 A.M.A.J. 675, 678 (1957). Cf.
note 26 supra.
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public laws on abortion (or homicide), it must in turn also pay the
price sometimes exacted by these laws in the isolated cases demand-
ing such a price.
Just as the state holds itself responsible for the support of fami-
lies bereaved by the death of soldiers fallen in the defense of their
country, it ought to provide for incapacitated people born and kept
alive in the defense of public moral standards. The community is
morally bound to relieve affected families of any financial or emo-
tional stress they cannot reasonably bear, either by accepting the
complete care of defective children in public institutions, or by
supplying medical and educational subsidies to ensure that such
families do not suffer any unfair economic disadvantages from their
misfortune.
G. Illegitimate Children
Similar considerations apply to children conceived by rape. The
circumstances of such a conception cannot have any bearing on the
child's title to life, and in the absence of any well-grounded chal-
lenge to this title there cannot be any moral justification for an
abortion. Once again, the burden rests with society to relieve an
innocent mother (if she so desires) from the consequences of an
unprovoked assault upon her virtue if the assailant cannot be found
and forced to discharge this responsibility to his child.
In the case of pregnancies resulting from incestuous, adulterous,
or otherwise illegitimate relations (which the mother did not re-
sist), there are additional considerations militating against any sanc-
tion of abortion. Jewish law not only puts an extreme penalty on
incest and adultery, but also imposes fearful disabilities on the prod-
ucts of such unions. It brands these relations as capital crimes,4"
and it debars children born under these conditions from marriage
with anyone except their like.47
(1) The Deterrent Effect.-Why exact such a price from in-
nocent children for the sins of their parents? The answer is simple:
to serve as a powerful deterrent to such hideous crimes. The would-
be partners to any such illicit sexual relations are to be taught that
their momentary pleasure would be fraught with the most disastrous
consequences for any children they might conceive. Through this
knowledge they are to recoil from the very thought of incest or adul-
46 See Leviticus 20:10-20.
47 See Deuteronomy 23:3, and Jewish commentaries.
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tery with the same horror as they would from contemplating murder
as a means to enjoyment or personal benefit. Murder is compara-
tively rare in civilized society for the very reason that the dreadful
consequences have evoked this horror of the crime in the public
conscience. Incest and adultery, in the Jewish view, are no lesser
crimes,48 and they require the same horror as an effective deterrent.
(2) Parental Responsibility.-Why create this deterrent by
visiting the sins of the parents on their innocent children? First, be-
cause there is no other way to expose an offense committed in private
and usually beyond the chance of detection. But, above all, this
responsibility of parents for the fate of their children is an inexor-
able necessity in the generation of human life; it is dictated by the
law of nature no less than by the moral law. If a careless mother
drops her baby and thereby causes a permanent brain injury to the
child, or if a syphilitic father irresponsibly transmits his disease to
his offspring before birth, or if parents are negligent in the education
of their children, all these children may innocently suffer and for the
rest of their lives expiate the sins of their parents. This is what must
be if parental responsibility is to be taken seriously. The fear that
such catastrophic consequences ensue from a surrender to temptation
or from carelessness will help prevent the conception of grossly dis-
advantaged children or their physical or mental mutilation after
birth.
H. Public Standards v. Individual Aberration
In line with this reasoning, Jewish law never condones the re-
laxation of public moral standards for the sake of saving recalcitrant
individuals from even mortal offenses. A celebrated Jewish sage
and philosopher of the fifteenth century, in connection with a ques-
tion submitted to his judgment, averred that it was always wrong for
a community to acquiesce in the slightest evil, however much it was
hoped thereby to prevent far worse excesses by individuals. The
problem he faced arose out of a suggestion that brothels for single
people be tolerated as long as such publicly controlled institutions
would reduce or eliminate the capital crime of marital faithlessness
then rampant. His unequivocal answer was: It is surely far better that
individuals should commit the worst offenses and expose themselves
4 8 Compare the juxtaposition of murder and adultery in the Ten Commandments.
Exodus 20:13.
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to the gravest penalties than publicly to promote the slightest com-
promise with the moral law. 9
Rigid abortion laws, ruling out the post facto "correction" of rash
acts, compel people to think twice before they recklessly embark on
illicit or irresponsible adventures liable to inflict lifelong suffering
or infamy on their progeny. To eliminate the scourge of illegiti-
mate children more self-discipline to prevent their conception is re-
quired, not more freedom to destroy them in the womb. For
each illegitimate child born because the abortion laws are strict,
there may be ten or more such children not conceived because these
laws are strict.
The exercise of man's procreative faculties, making him (in the
phrase of the Talmud) "a partner with- God in creation," is man's
greatest privilege and gravest responsibility. The rights and obliga-
tions implicit in the generation of human life must be evenly bal-
anced if man is not to degenerate into an addict of lust and a moral
parasite infesting the moral organism of society. Liberal abortion
laws would upset that balance by facilitating sexual indulgences
without insisting on corresponding responsibilities.
L Therapeutic Abortions
This leaves only the concern for the mother's safety as a valid
argument in favor of abortions. In the view of Judaism, all human
rights, and their priorities, derive solely from their conferment upon
man by his Creator. By this criterion, as defined in the Bible, the
rights of the mother and her unborn child are distinctly unequal,
since the capital guilt of murder takes effect only if the victim was
a born and viable person. This recognition does not imply that the
destruction of a fetus is not a very grave offense against the sanctity
of human life, but only that it is not technically murder. Jewish
law makes a similar distinction in regard to the killing of inviable
adults. While the killing of a person who already suffered from
a fatal injury (from other than natural causes) is not actionable as
murder,"o the killer is morally guilty of a mortal offense.'
This inequality, then, is weighty enough only to warrant the
sacrifice of the unborn child if the pregnancy otherwise poses a
threat to the mother's life. Indeed, the Jewish concern for the
49 ARAMA, AKEDATH YITZC-AK ch. 20, at 41(b) (ed. Frankfurt a/o 1785).
50 TALMUD, Sanhedrin 78a.
51 Maimonides acquits such a murderer only before "a human court." HIL. ROT-
ZE'AcH 2:7-8. Cf. note 4 supra.
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mother is so great that a gravid woman sentenced to death must
not be subjected to the ordeal of suspense to await the delivery of
her child."3 (Jewish sources brand any delay in the execution, once
it is finally decreed, as "the perversion of justice" par excellence,5 4
since the criminal is sentenced to die, not to suffer.)
Such a threat to the mother need not be either immediate or
absolutely certain. Even a remote risk of life invokes all the life-
saving concessions of Jewish law, 5 provided the fear of such a risk
is genuine and confirmed by the most competent medical opinions.
Hence, Jewish law would regard it as an indefensible desecration
of human life to allow a mother to perish in order to save her un-
born child.
IV. CONCLUSION
This review may be fittingly concluded with a reference to the
very first Jewish statement on deliberate abortion. Commenting
on the Septuagint version of the above-quoted Exodus passage," the
Alexandrian-Jewish philosopher, Philo, at the beginning of the Cur-
rent Era declared that the attacker must die if the fruit he caused
to be lost was already "shaped and all the limbs had their proper
qualities, for that which answers to this description is a human be-
ing... like a statue lying in a studio requiring nothing more than
to be conveyed outside."5" The legal conclusion of this statement,
reflecting Hellenistic rather than Jewish influence, may vary from
the letter of Jewish law; but its reasoning ceitainly echoes the spirit
of Jewish law. The analogy may be more meaningful than Philo
could have intended or foreseen. A classic statue by a supreme
master is no less priceless for being made defective, even with an
arm or a leg missing. The destruction of such a treasure can be
warranted only by the superior worth of preserving a living human
being.
52 In practice Jewish law virtually abolished capital punishment thousands of years
ago, as it insisted on numerous conditions whose fulfillment was almost impossible
(such as the presence of, and prior warning by, two eye-witnesses).
53 TALMUD, Erakhin 1:4; TALMUD, TosAPHoTH, Erakhin 7a.
54 ET cs OF THE FATHERS 5:8.
5 5 SHULcHAN AiRuKH, Orach Chayim 329:2-4.
56 See text accompanying note 3 supra.
5 7 DE SPEC LEGmUS 3:108-10, 117-18; DE VIRTUT. 138. But in the latter two
passages, Philo himself qualified his statement by calling only a person who killed a
child already born "indubitably a murderer."
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